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RECENT BOOKS
THE JUDICIAL DECISION-

TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION.

By Richard A. Wasserstrom. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1961.

Pp. 197. $5.
The perennial concern over the processes of judicial decision seems
again in full bloom. Wasserstrom's book follows close on the heels of Karl
Llewellyn's great study of the common law appellate tradition. The
current political debate over the role of the Supreme Court in constitutional interpretation mingles with the more narrowly professional discussion of judicial revisions of accepted common-law doctrines. A number of
recent decisions highlight the current wave of judicial activism by employing the device of prospective overruling. Whether we now confront
a "crisis in confidence" in our appellate courts, as Llewellyn believed, and
if so, how deep and pervasive that crisis may be, I don't know. If such a
crisis has arisen, I should think Wasserstrom's little book would contribute
to our surviving it with a decent faith in the integrity and viability of our
judicial institutions.
. As Wasserstrom's sub-title makes clear, his central theme is not how
courts in fact decide cases but how they ought to decide them. This
statement requires clarification, however, to emphasize his useful distinction between the process of discovery, that is, the procedure by which a
court reaches its conclusion, and the process of justification by which the
conclusion is supported or justified. Wasserstrom does not purport to deal
descriptively with either of these processes; rather he writes normatively.
With becoming modesty he suggests that his study merely moves toward a
theory of legal justification, adding: "If the work succeeds at all, it does
so not because it presents any definitive theory of how all cases ought to
be decided, but because it lays bare some of the implications of certain
of the more obvious ways in which courts might go about deciding cases."
(p. 8)
The author's normative orientation is clearly articulated in his assump-

tion that the function of the legal system is essentially utilitarian, that is,
"that a desirable legal system is one that succeeds in giving maximum effect
to the needs, desires, interests, and aspirations of the members of the society
of which it is a part." (p. 10) No defense of the assumption is made
beyond the assertion that it is "the common view." The purpose of the

study is to explore the relation to this general end of three possible
procedures of legal justification-the procedure of precedent, the procedure
of equity and what Wasserstrom calls the "two-level procedure."

As a prelude to his analysis of the procedure of precedent, Wasserstrom
analyzes the various attacks that have been made on even the possibility

of a deductive procedure in judicial decision making. Those writers who

[531]

532

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

have denied the descriptive accuracy and even the possibility of a deductive
procedure and who have insisted that judicial decisions result from either
the intuition, personality or emotions of the judge, he charges with the
"irrationalist fallacy." This mistake proceeds from a recognition of the
limited utility of formal logic to an assertion that courts cannot have used
any rational or objective criteria of decision. In part this fallacy is
attributable to a failure of legal philosophers to distinguish between
procedures of discovery and procedures of justification. Wasserstrom's
interest is in the latter and he firmly insists that a deductive procedure
like that suggested by the typical judicial opinion is a feasible, though not
necessarily desirable, mode of justification even if it does not delineate the
route followed by the court in reaching or "discovering" its conclusion.
One of the most useful chapters analyzes some typical discussions of
the doctrine of precedent. This analysis cannot be summarized here. It
suffices to say that the frustrating indeterminateness at critical points of
most of the discussion is brought out sharply. Most formulations of the
doctrine appear to recognize that in certain instances the existence of a
relevant rule drawn from precedent does not necessarily justify a decision
in accordance with that rule. The discussion becomes ambiguous or
vacuous at the point of identifying those cases requiring a departure from
precedential rule. For purposes of his discussion, however, Wasserstrom
accepts a formulation of the doctrine that avoids this difficulty by its absoluteness. Thus as he deals with the first of the "ideal procedures" of
justification, the doctrine of precedent means that it is sufficient justification of any decision that it is consistent with a rule derived from precedent
for that class of cases. The procedure of precedent, thus conceived, is
then examined in the light of the usual justifications of certainty, the protection of reliance, equality and efficiency and each is found insufficient
to support absolute adherence to precedent.
The procedure of equity may be offered as an alternative to reliance
on precedent. Exactly what this procedure is remains unclear. It may range
from the extreme theory of particularized justice, that finds conclusive
justification for decision in an intuition of the deciding judge, to what
Wasserstrom calls non-intuitive equity which demands that the judge
consider "rationally" all the facts of the particular case and decide in the
way that "best takes into account the interests of the litigants who are
currently before the court." (p. 114) Implicit also in many discussions of
non-intuitive equity is the suggestion that courts should be free to take
into account relevant moral rules. Wasserstrom does not immediately pass
judgment on the procedure of non-intuitive equity. Rather he raises certain
questions as to the meaning of the procedure with a warning that the
answers to those questions may indicate that non-intuitive equity is not an
''equitable" procedure at all.
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The third or "two-level" procedure of legal justification is introduced
by a summary analysis of extreme and restricted utilitarianism to which
moral philosophers in recent years have devoted much attention. Restricted
utilitarianism refers the justification of any individual act to a relevant
moral rule while the moral rules are themselves evaluated by their capacity
to promote happiness or minimize conflict. By contrast, extreme utilitarianism refers the individual act itself directly to the standard of promotion of happiness. While recognizing that there is no necessary theoretical
or practical difference between these two approaches if each is used
carefully, Wasserstrom insists that restricted utilitarianism has two advantages that justify its existence as a separate doctrine. First, by its reference
of the particular decision to rules, restricted utilitarianism better assures
the careful consideration of long-term consequences of various decisional
possibilities. Extreme utilitarianism, while theoretically competent to take
the long view, at least runs the risk of losing it in the immediacy of the
problem case. Second, restricted utilitarianism leaves open the possibility
of recognizing certain classes of cases in which application of a certain
rule free of exceptions and not easily revisable would produce the greatest
overall quantum of happiness even though in some statistically determined
percentage of cases, not individually identifiable in the present state of
human knowledge, it would produce injustice.
Wasserstrom's "two-level" procedure of legal justification is simply the
application of restricted utilitarianism to the work of the courts. In any
case the judge would determine the existence of a relevant rule from
precedent, and the rational relation of the instant case to that rule would
form the basis for a satisfactory justification unless it were shown on
utilitarian grounds that a different rule would more effectively approach
the utilitarian goal. Such a showing would be made, however, by considering not merely the interests of the litigants before the court but also
the interests of the broader social group that would be affected by the
new rule the court might be urged to formulate. At this point, the basis
of Wasserstrom's preference for the "two-level" procedure over the procedure of non-intuitive equity becomes clear. While the latter may be able
to accommodate a calculation of relative happiness and unhappiness of
the parties immediately before the court, only the former enables the court
to take properly into account the long-term effects on persons of the classes
represented by the present litigants.
The contribution of the study clearly does not lie in a novel theory of
legal justification. In fact, as Wasserstrom expressly recognizes, the "twolevel" procedure he advocates is identical or at least quite similar to the
techniques actually employed by the courts. Further, it should be noted
that Wasserstrom's normative theory assumes the propriety of judicial
modification of established rules when a utilitarian calculation warrants
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it. He thus avoids the question agitating most current discussion-within
what limits can such judicial activism be accommodated if we are to
preserve the traditional image of judicial functions in the context of a
representative democracy. I do not, however, propose to cavil because the
author did not write on a different subject. Wasserstrom has made a
thoughtful and incisive contribution to all who feel concern that the
judicial process produce rational justifications reconciling insofar as possible the recurrent and conflicting claims of stability and change.
William B. Harvey,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

